Ben Wallace: With permission, I would like to make a statement on the publication of our refreshed defence Command Paper. It is just over two years since we published the original Command Paper in March 2021. In those two years, our security has been challenged in so many ways. This is Defence’s response to a more contested and volatile world.
In the last four years that I have been Defence Secretary, I have been consistent about the reform I have sought to implement. I want Defence to be threat-led—understanding and acting on the threats facing our nation as our sole mission; not protecting force structures, cap badges or much-loved equipment but ensuring that we are focused on challenging threats.
I want the Ministry of Defence to be a campaigning Department, adopting a more proactive posture, and our forces more forward and present in the world, with a return to campaigning assertively and constantly, pushing back those threats and our adversaries. I want Defence to be sustainable in every sense. For too long, Defence was hollowed out by both Labour and Conservative Governments, leaving our forces overstretched and underequipped. We must match our ambitions to our resources, our equipment plans to our budget, and take care of our people to sustain them in their duties. We must never forget the travesty of the Snatch Land Rovers in Afghanistan.
The 2021 defence Command Paper was true to those principles and, with some tough choices, presented an honest plan for what we can and will achieve: a credible force, capable of protecting the nation, ready to meet the threats of today but investing heavily to modernise for those of the future; a force in which every major platform would be renewed by 2035, from armoured vehicles to Dreadnought submarines, frigates to satellites.
We did not plan on issuing a new Command Paper just two years on. Many of the conclusions of that Command Paper remain right: Russia was and is the greatest threat to European security, and China’s rapid military modernisation and growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific and beyond do pose an increasing challenge to us all. However, I have always said that as the situation changes, we must change with it. Since the first DCP was released, the world has shifted once more, from a competitive age to a contested and volatile world. The technology advances we predicted materialised. The threats and challenges we feared have manifested.
There is no more immediate threat than Russia. Its full-scale invasion of Ukraine was not simply an assault on a proud and sovereign nation but an attack on all our values, European security and the open international order on which stability and prosperity have depended for over three quarters of a century. Right now, the people of Ukraine are suffering the tragic consequences of President Putin’s illegal, unprovoked invasion. His naked aggression and imperial ambitions have played out in a tragedy of epic human suffering. The brave citizen soldiers of the armed forces of Ukraine are protecting their own nation and people, quite heroically taking on the once mighty Russian forces. The whole  House recognises that they fight not just for their freedom but for ours. They are not just liberating their homeland but defending the rules-based system.
As Defence Secretary it is important to import the lessons learned from the conflict to our own forces. While I wish such lessons were generated in a different war, the conflict has become an incubator of new ways of war. They are proving the way for warfare in the 2020s—whole of nation, internationally partnered, innovative, digitised, operating with a tempo, precision and range requirement and a recognition that there is a trade-off between assurance levels and operational impact.
I am proud, too, of the role the UK is playing in supporting Ukraine, whether providing equipment, training or political support, or galvanising European and international allies and industrial partners to do likewise. But the return of war to the continent of Europe, alongside growing threats elsewhere in the world, has meant that we must sharpen our approach. The integrated review refresh published in March outlined how we would do that. It would shape the global strategic environment, increase our focus on deterrence and defence, address vulnerabilities that leave our nation exposed and invest in the UK’s unique strengths.
Defence is central to all those efforts. That is why, after three decades in which all parties have continued drawing the post cold-war peace dividend, this Prime Minister reversed that trend and provided Defence with an additional £24 billion over four years. He and the Chancellor have gone further since, in response to the war in Ukraine. Next year we will spend over £50 billion on defence for the first time in our history. That is nearly £12 billion a year more cash investment than when I became Defence Secretary in 2019—a real-terms increase of more than 10%. This Government have committed to increasing spending yet further over the longer term to 2.5% of GDP, as we improve the fiscal position and grow our economy.
Our defence plans, and the armed forces to deliver them, must be robust and credible—not fantasy force designs, unfunded gimmicks or top trump numbers. As Russia has so effectively proven, there is no point having parade ground armies and massed ranks of men and machines if they cannot be integrated as a single, full spectrum force, sustained in the field under all the demands of modern warfighting. That takes professional forces, well equipped and rapidly adaptable, supported by critical enablers and vast stockpiles of munitions. That is why in this document, hon. Members will not find shiny new announcements, comms-led policies driving unsustainable force designs or any major new platforms for military enthusiasts to put up on their charts on their bedroom wall. We stand by the Command Paper we published in 2021 but we must get there faster, doing defence differently and getting ourselves on to a campaign footing to protect the nation and help it prosper.
As I said standing here when DCP21 was announced, we owe it to the men and women of our armed forces to make policy reality. The work was just beginning. In this refresh, we have focused on how to drive the lessons of Ukraine into our core business and on how to recover the warfighting resilience needed to generate credible conventional deterrence. The great advantage of having served in Defence for some time is that my ministerial team and I have now taken a proper look   under the bonnet. Consequently, we are clear that our strategic advantage derives from four key sources which require urgent prioritisation.
First and foremost are our first-class people. Our men and women are not just brave and committed, but talented and incredibly skilled. They are our real battle-winning capability. It is our duty to ensure they are as well supported, prepared and equipped as possible, so we are going to invest in them. Last year, I commissioned Richard Haythornthwaite to conduct the first review of workforce incentivisation for almost 30 years. It is such good work that we are incorporating the response into our Command Paper, and today I am unveiling a new employment model and skills framework for our armed forces. It will offer our people a spectrum of service that allows far greater career flexibility, making it easier for military personnel to zig-zag between different roles, whether regular or reserve, or between the civil service and industry.
We are transforming our forces’ overall employment offer by adopting a total reward approach to provide a much more compelling and competitive incentivisation package. Since all our armed forces personnel deserve the best quality accommodation, we are injecting a further £400 million to improve our service accommodation in the next two years. Many of us over Christmas will have been frustrated by the poor support our service personnel and their families received from those tasked with looking after their accommodation. It is for that reason that I have withheld their profit and used the money to freeze for one year only the rent increases our personnel were due to pay. Taken together alongside such initiatives as wraparound childcare, they are intended to enrich careers and enhance the ability of our most talented people to keep protecting the British people, and to ensure they are rewarded and fulfilled while they do so.
Our second priority is further strengthening our scientific and technological base. We are already world leaders in specific areas, but to continue outmatching our adversaries we must stay ahead of the curve in digital, data and emerging scientific fields. In 2021, we said we would invest £6.6 billion in advanced research and development. In fact, we are now investing significantly more to stay ahead in the technologies proving themselves vital on the battlefields of Ukraine, such as AI, quantum and robotics. We are enabling a culture of innovation across Defence, pulling through those R&D breakthroughs to the frontline. Following in Ukraine’s footsteps, we are increasingly sourcing the £100 solutions that can stop £100 million threats in their tracks, winning both the kinetic and economic exchanges of modern warfare.
Of course, our ability to do that depends on the quality of our relationship with the industry, which is our third priority. I am pushing the Ministry of Defence to form a closer alliance with our industrial partners. A genuine partnership to sustain our defence will mean doing things differently. Ukraine reminds us that time waits for no one. It is no good holding out for the 100% solution that is obsolete by the time it is launched. Often, 80% is good enough, especially if it means swiftly putting kit into the hands of our service personnel. Capabilities can be rapidly upgraded, spirally developed, for the relentless cycles of battlefield adaptation to win  the innovation battle. Instead of sticking to acquisition programmes that drag on for decades, we are setting maximum delivery periods of five years for hardware and three years for digital programmes.
Our fourth priority is productivity and campaigning. To face this increasingly contested and volatile world, we need to make major changes to the machinery of the Department and its methods. We are emphasising an ethos focused ruthlessly on the delivery of real-world effect, increasing the bang for buck in everything we do. This approach reaches into every part of the Defence enterprise, from the front line to the back office, and involves a major redesign of the Department. We must shift our whole organisational culture away from the previous peacetime mentality to one where we live and operate as we would fight, focusing more on outputs than inputs and achieving a better balance between risk and reward. That means empowering people to live and operate alongside partners, and sometimes to be enabled by them when in lower threat environments. That means ensuring our equipment, whether Type 31, Challenger 3, or Typhoons, has the infrastructure and supplies needed to sustain operations more of the time and to deliver real-world effect wherever and whenever it is needed. And it means working with the relevant regulatory authorities, for example the Military Aviation Authority, to accelerate the experimentation, testing and innovating of new technologies, while remaining within legal bounds.
I want to emphasise one final aspect of the Command Paper refresh, namely the development of a global campaigning approach. We started with a review of our head office, where we broke out campaign delivery from policy formation and established integrated campaign teams. They have adversary focuses, not geographic, and will drive our enduring campaigns in the same way operational commanders lead our forces on deployed operations. The indivisibility of operational theatres in today’s world means Defence must be constantly ready to respond globally to safeguard our interests and those of our allies. Sometimes it will be to evacuate our citizens in moments of crisis, such as in Sudan. Other times it will be to deter an adversary or reassure a friend. As we have shown through our support for Ukraine, the UK Government have the political will, but that only matters if it is matched by our military agility. Today, we are establishing a defence global response force. Ready, integrated and lethal, it will better cohere existing forces from across land, sea, air, space and cyber, to get there first in response to unpredictable events around the world.
Crucially, today’s paper also recognises that it is in the interconnected world and that the UK is unlikely to act alone. Partnerships are critical to our security and prosperity. In future, we will be allied by design and national by exception. Our support for NATO will remain iron-clad, but we will continue to prioritise our core relationships. We will invest in deepening relationships with our new partners. It is why we have invested to expand our global defence network, improving communications, and co-ordinating defence attachés within our intelligence functions. None of that is headline-grabbing stuff, but it is the fine details that make the difference to our national security.
To conclude, the paper is the result of having several years in the Department to understand where it needs most attention. That continuity in office is improving  and I am incredibly grateful to the long-serving Minister for Armed Forces, my right hon. Friend the Member for Wells (James Heappey), whose experience in uniform and public office provided the basis for this paper. We are grateful to the hundreds of individuals and groups who contributed to the first challenge phase of its drafting, from academics to serving personnel and industry representatives, not to mention the many Members of this House. Most of what we learned from them is encapsulated in the document.
This is likely to be one of my last appearances at the Dispatch Box. It has been the greatest privilege to serve as Secretary of State for Defence for the last four years. I thank my team, civil servants, special advisers and Members for their support and their challenge. All of us here have the common interest of defending this fine country, its values and its freedoms. Of all the many functions of Government, Defence is the most important and is more important than ever, as the next 10 years will be more unstable and insecure. The men and women of our armed forces are second to none and Britain’s place in the world is anchored in their professionalism and sacrifice. I believe we will increasingly call on them in the years ahead. We must ensure that they are ready to answer that call. I wish them and whomever replaces me well. I commend the statement to the House.